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CASE COMMENTS
provisions. 20 The final disposition of the present case was proper on
law and in principle. If the issue were simply one of choice between
expediency and the right to trial by jury, clearly the constitutional
right should prevail. But, whether one believes that the jury system
should be eliminated 2 ' or that men should be called to account by their
peers, 2 2 public policy requires that litigants should not be afforded the
opportunity to speculate on their chances and be permited a second day
in court on belated assertion of the right to trial by jury.
FRANK L. PYLE
TRADE NAMES: THE COMMON-LAW RIGHT OF A
CORPORATION TO THE PROTECTION OF ITS NAME
Consumers Finance Co. v. Consumer's Loan Service, Inc.,
36 So.2d 443 (Fla. 1948)
The Consumers Finance Company was organized to conduct a small
loan business in Jacksonville, Florida. Subsequently the Consumer's Loan
Service was organized to conduct a like business in the same city. Bill
by Consumers Finance Company to enjoin the use of the word "Con-
sumer's" incidental to defendant competitor's business was dismissed.
On appeal, HELD, bill properly dismissed for want of equity. Decree
affirmed, Chief Justice Thomas, Justices Barns and Hobsori dissenting.
A trade name is property and is entitled to protection by the courts,'
even in absence of statute.2 A trade name is acquired without a copy-
20FIA. STAT. §§66.28-66.47 (Cum. Supp. 1947); see Note, 1 U. or FLA. L. REv.
395, 405 (1948).
2'Clark and Shulman, Jury Trial in Civil Cases-A Study in Judicial Admin-
istration, 43 YALE L. J. 867 (1934); James, Trial by Jury and the New Rules oj
Federal Procedure, 45 YALE L. J. 1022, 1026 (1936).
1 ARSTOTrE, Poranics, bk. III, c. 11, *1282a (Jowett trans.); cf. Corbin, The
Jury on Trial, 14 A. B. A. J. 507 (1928).
'Acme Chem. Co. v. Dobkin, 68 F. Supp. 601 (W. D. Pa. 1946); Foss v. Cul-
bertson, 17 Wash.2d. 610, 136 P.2d 711 (1943).
2Standard Oil Shares v. Standard Oil Group, 17 Del. Ch. 113, 150 Aft. 174
(1930); Consolidated Home Spec. Co. v. Plotkin, 358 Pa. 14, 55 A.2d 404 (1947).
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right, by adoption and usage, and belongs to the one who first approp-
riated it and gave it value.3
The universal rule is that protection extends to the first appropriator, 4
within the territorial scope of its business, 5 against subsequent use of
the same or similar name by another. 6 Similarity such as would con-
fuse the general public is sufficient to justify relief. 7  It is not
necessary that both companies be in direct competition if both are in the
same commercial field.8 Injunction is the proper remedy, and this relief
attaches regardless of the nature of the corporation involved. 9
The intent of the subsequent user need not be shown, the rule being
that, if there is sufficient similarity to confuse or deceive, intent is
immaterial.' 0 Fraud is assumed, since the consequences and not the
motives are controlling. 11 The organizers of a corporation are charged with
the duty of selecting a name which will not infringe upon another's trade
name.12 A state charter to operate under a particular name is no license
to infringe1
3
"Standard Oil Co. of N. M. v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 56 F 2d 973 (C. C. A.
10th 1932).
'Acme Chem. Co. v. Dobkin, 68 F. Supp, 601 (W. D. Pa. 1946); First Born
Church v. The First Born Church, 156 Fla. 78, 22 So.2d 452 (1945).
'Stewarts Sandwiches v. Seward's Cafeteria, 60 F.2d 981 (S. D. N. Y. 1932);
Addison v. Hook, 91 Fla. 737, 107 So. 623 (1926).
'See note 4 supra.
'Middletown Trust Co. v. Middletown Nat. Bank, 110 Conn. 13, 147 AUl. 22
(1929); McGhan v. McGhan, 115 Fla. 414, 155 So. 653 (1934).
8Akron-Overland Tire Co. v. Willys-Overland Co., 273 Fed. 674 (C. C. A. 3rd
1921); Long's Hat Stores v. Long's Clothes, 224 App. Div. 497, 231 N. Y. Supp.
107 (1928); cf. Churchill Downs Distilling Co. v. Churchill Downs, 262 Ky. 567,
90 S. W.2d 1041 (1936). But cf. Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden's Condensed
Milk Co., 201 Fed. 510 (C. C. A. 7th 1912).
'Liberty Life Assur. Soc'y v. Heralds of Liberty, 15 Del. Ch. 369, 138 AtI. 634
(1927); First Born Church v. The First Born Church, 156 Fla. 78, 22 So.2d 452
(1945); Saunders System Atlanta Co. v. Drive It Yourself Co., 158 Ga. 123, 123
S. E. 132 (1924); cf. Modern Woodmen v. Hatfield, 199 Fed. 270 (D. C. Kan.
1912).
"0American Products Co. v. American Products Co., 42 F2d 4S3 (E. D. Mfich.
1930); Children's Bootery v. Sutker, 91 Fla. 60, 107 So. 345 (1926); cf. Cockrell
v. Davis, 198 Miss. 660, 23 So.2d 256 (1945). Contra: Table Supply Stores v.
Home Supply Stores, 115 Fla. 188, 155 So. 317 (1934).
'1 McGhan v. McGhan, 115 Fla. 414, 155 So. 653 (1934); Polackoff v. Sunkin,
115 N. J. Eq. 134, 169 Atil. 724 (1934) ; cf. Municipal Street Sign Co. v. City Street
Sign Corp., 30 F. Supp 795 (E. D. N. Y. 1940).
2General Film Co. of Missouri v. General Film Co. of Maine, 237 Fed. 64 (C.
C. A. 8th 1916); Local Loan Co. v. Local Finance Corp., 56 F. Supp. 658 (E. D.
Wis. 1944); Children's Bootery v. Sutker, 91 Fla. 60, 107 So. 345 (1926).
"3Household Finance Corp. of Delaware v. Household Flmane Corp. of West
2
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The general rule is subject to the exception that words purely de-
scriptive,14 generic,' 5 or geographical' 6 are not entitled to exclusive
appropriation.37 These words in their primary sense are considered
publici juris and the common property of all.' 8 However, this exception
is qualified in that, when a corporation takes a name purely descriptive
of its business and is the first to enter a particular field under that
name, it can be said to have originated that line of business and applied
a name to such business; and, by reason of having been first applied to
this business, these primarily descriptive words may acquire a secondary
meaning, indicating to the public the particular business involved.' 9
When a corporation has chosen such descriptive words to identify itself,
it is incumbent upon the corporation to show the existence of a secondary
meaning before it is entitled to restrain others from the use of such
words.20 Secondary meaning is nothing more than association. 21 It
exists only in the minds of those who identify some article of commerce
or business house by a particular name or sign and associate the two in
their minds. 22 This qualified exception has been almost universally
accepted in the United States.2 3 In the principal case the majority
Va., 11 F. Supp. 3 (N. D. W. Va. 1935); New Orleans Checker Cabs v. Mumphrey,
205 La. 1083, 18 So.2d 629 (1944).
"'General Finance Loan Co. v. General Loan Co., 163 F.2d 709 (C. C. A. 8th
1947); Home Beverage Service v. Baas, 210 La. 873, 28 So.2d 481 (1946).
'Louisville Taxicab & Tranfer Co. v. Yellow Cab Transit Co., 53 F. Supp. 272
(W. D. Ky. 1943); American Auto. Ass'n v. American Auto. Owners' Ass'n, 216 Cal.
125, 13 P.2d 707 (1932).
1'Surf Club v. Tatem Surf Club, 151 Fla. 406, 10 So.2d 554 (1942); Addison
v. Hook, 91 Fla. 337, 107 So. 623 (1926).
"Standard Oil Shares v. Standard Oil Group, 17 Del. Ch. 113, 150 Ad. 174
(1930).
'General Industries Co. v. 20 Wacker Drive Bldg. Corp., 156 F.2d 474 (C. C.
A. 7th 1946); Addison v. Hook, 91 Fla. 337, 107 So. 623 (1926).
"Diamond Drill Contracting Co. v. International Diamond Drill Contracting Co.,
106 Wash. 72, 179 Pac. 120 (1919).
"Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. v. Kline, 132 F.2d 520, 524 (C. C. A. 8th
1942).
"Nmrs, UNFAIR COmPETmnON A" TRADfMAaxS §37 (4th ed. 1947).
"U-Drive-It Co. v. Wright & Taylor, 270 Ky. 610, 110 S. W.2d 449 (1937).
"General Finance Loan Co. v. General Loan Co., 163 F.2d 709 (C. C. A. 8th
1947); Local Loan Co. v. Local Finance Corp., 56 F. Supp. 658 (E. D. Wis. 1944);
Boise v. Stevenson, 66 Ariz. 308, 187 P.2d 648 (1947); Surf Club v. Tatem Surf
Club, 151 Fla. 406, 10 So.2d 554 (1942).
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took the view that the plaintiff failed to establish this secondary meaning.
Even when a litigant is unable to establish an exclusive right to a
name, relief can be granted on the basis of unfair competition.2 4 With
this in view, it is important to note that, when a business offers itself
only to a small, highly specialized group, capable of close discrimination,
a greater degree of similarity will be tolerated than when the business
offers itself generally to all comers, most of whom will respond to
similarity and will not investigate identity.25
The authority cited in support of dismissal of the instant bill2o
can be distinguished upon the observation previously made. In those
cases the transactions between business house and customer were limited
to a relatively small and highly specialized group, capable of close
scrutiny as to the business with which they were dealing; whereas the
small loan business offers itself to all comers and not to any specialized
group in the field of commerce. Thus, only a slight degree of similarity
in name would be sufficient to invoke relief, there being a stronger
likelihood that the public would be misled than if the parties dealt with
only a limited group. Had this rule been applied to the facts of the
principal case, the results reached by the Court might well have been
different.
DEwEY A. DYE, JR.
2 Household Finance Corp. of Delaware v. Household Finance Corp. of W.
Va.. 11 F. Supp. 3 (N. D. W. Va. 1935); Personal Finance Co. v. Personal Loan
Service. 133 Neb. 373, 275 N. W. 324 (1937); Foss v. Culbertson, 17 Wash.2d 610,
136 P.2d 711 (1943); cf. Gottdiener v. Joe's Restaurant, 111 Fla. 741, 149 So. 646
(1933).
2 Reliance Steel Corp. v. Reliance Trading Corp., 56 F. Supp. 549 (E. D. Pa.
1944); La Pointe Machine Tool Co. v. J. N. La Pointe Co., 115 Me. 472, 99 Atl. 348
(1916); Central Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Central Mutual Ins. Co., 275 Mich. 554, 267
N. W. 733 (1936); New York Trust Co. v. New York County Trust Co., 125 Misc.
735, 211 N. Y. Supp. 785 (1925); Federal Securities Co. v. Federal Securities Corp.,
120 Ore. 375, 276 Pac. 1100 (1929); Diamond Drill Contracting Co. v. Interna-
tional Diamond-Drill Contracting Co., 106 Wash. 72, 179 Pac. 120 (1919).
2 Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. v. Lumber Mutual Casualty Co., 154 Fla.
367, 17 So.2d 615, alrd, 155 Fla. 297, 19 So.2d 865 (1944), citing: Fidelity Bond &
Mtg. Co. v. Fidelity Bond & Mtg. Co. of Texas, 33 F.2d 580 (S. D. Tex. 1929),
International Trust Co. v. International Loan & Trust Co., 153 Mass. 271, 26
N. E. 693 (1891), Federal Securities Co. v. Federal Securities Corp., 129 Ore. 375,
276 Pac. 1100 (1929).
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